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"It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its consti-
tutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled 
by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To 
this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a danger-
ous source of authority, and should not be regarded as decid-
ing questions of constitutional power except where the acqui-
escence of the people and the States can be considered as well 
settled." 
President Andrew Jackson, rejecting McCulloch v. Maryland, 
while vetoing the renewal of the Bank of the United States 
more than 40 years after President Washington had held the 
Bank constitutional.' 
INTRODUCfiON 
One immediate tension that any conservative in the field of 
law must necessarily feel is between the demands of the text of 
the Constitution, as it was originally understood, and the de-
mands of precedent. Conservative lawyers typically accept that 
the Constitution is higher law but disagree about whether that 
higher law is the enacted constitutional text or the traditions and 
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precedents that have grown up over 215 years of governing un-
der that text. Original-meaning textualists like Professors Gary 
Lawson and Michael Stokes Paulsen argue that the key to consti-
tutional meaning is to be found in the objective public meaning 
of key words and clauses as they were understood in 1787 or 
1868. Professor Akhil Amar makes much the same point, argu-
ing that the Constitutional text is normatively better than the 
doctrine that the Court has developed to interpret it.2 
In contrast, certain Burkean law professors like Thomas 
Merrill,3 Barry Friedman,4 and Ernie Y oung5 have argued that it 
is a mistake to elevate the understandings of 1787 or 1868 above 
the understandings of all of the generations and justices that 
have lived under and construed the Constitution since its adop-
tion. Some self-professed Burkeans go even further and argue 
not just for tradition and practice as the well-spring of constitu-
tional law but for Supreme Court doctrine and caselaw as the 
only valid source of constitutional law, even when that caselaw 
flies in the face of tradition as it does today with respect to abor-
tion and gay rights. This theory of so-called common law consti-
tutionalism is most ably defended by Professor David Strauss.6 A 
sophisticated variant on this theory is propounded by Professor 
Richard Fallon7 and, most recently, Charles Fried has written 
that the Supreme Court is and ought to be controlled by its doc-
trine.8 
In this essay, I lay out an argument as to why the Supreme 
Court ought to follow the text of the Constitution, as originally 
2. Akhil Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26 
(2000). 
3. Thomas W. Merrill, Burke v. Bark, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509 (1996); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005). 
4. Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1 (1998). Professor Friedman does not describe himself as a Burkean, unlike Pro-
fessor Merrill, but it seems like an apt label for what he advocates in The Sedimentary 
Constitution. See also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2596 (2003). 
5. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REv. 619 (1994). 
6. David A. Strauss, Common lAw Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996). 
7. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 582-585 (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Stare 
Decisis and the Constitution]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Con-
structivist Coherence Theory]. 
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SUPREME COURT (2004). 
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understood, rather than its own precedents, where there is clear 
conflict between the two. I will defend this claim with first, 
originalist arguments and second, with normative arguments. I 
conclude by applying my approach to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey and argue 
that that case's discussion of stare decisis is fatally flawed and 
ought itself to be overruled. In my view, the Casey discussion of 
precedent is at odds with both the understanding of the Framers 
of the Constitution and with good public policy. Far from being a 
"super-duper precedent," in the notorious words of Senate Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, Casey is a case that 
should be swiftly overruled-even without regard to whether 
Roe v. Wade should also be overruled. The Casey discussion of 
stare decisis is just plain wrong. 
I begin, in Part I below, by asking what the framing genera-
tion of our original Constitution thought about the problem of 
text and precedent. I will argue that the views of the framers are 
best illustrated in the long fight over the constitutionality of the 
Bank of the United States, one of our earliest national constitu-
tional controversies. My claim is that the fight over the Bank of 
the United States ended not with McCulloch v. Maryland's fa-
mous endorsement of the constitutionality of the Bank, almost 
three decades after the Bank bill passed Congress, but with the 
veto by President Andrew Jackson of the effort to renew the 
Bank in 1832, thirteen years later. Jackson's success in killing the 
Bank on the grounds of unconstitutionality, some forty years af-
ter it was first created, shows that, early on, Americans vener-
ated constitutional text over what Jackson called the "dangerous 
source of authority" which is "mere precedent. "9 
In Part II below, I consider the sophisticated and thought-
provoking normative case that Burkean law Professor Thomas 
Merrill makes in this symposium issue and elsewhere as to why 
conservatives and others should favor what he calls Burkeanism 
or conventionalism in constitutional interpretation over original-
ism. I consider each normative argument Professor Merrill 
makes and conclude that textualism, as it is practiced in this 
country, is more normatively appealing than the strong rule of 
stare decisis and of precedent for which Professor Merrill argues. 
Professor Merrill's fundamental error is that he uses too short a 
time frame in concluding that precedent is democratic, that it 
preserves continuity with the past, and that courts' failing to fol-
9. Veto Message, supra note 1, at 1144. 
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low precedent is activist. In constitutional law, one's time hori-
zon must be multi-generational When the correct time horizon is 
used, I show that it is actually undemocratic and activist for the 
Supreme Court to follow precedent when it ought to follow the 
constitutional text. 
Finally, in Part III below, I will ask whether in cases where 
there has been substantial reliance, as there was with the Bank, 
we ought to insist that long-standing precedents be challenged 
first by the political rather than the judicial branches of govern-
ment. Here I will make only a limited claim. I will argue that 
whenever one of the political branches of the national govern-
ment or a majority of the States challenge the Supreme Court 
with respect to its precedent, even of long-standing, the Court is 
duty bound to decide the constitutional question according to 
the original meaning of the text without regard to precedent or 
doctrine. If either the President or Congress reach a policy de-
termination that a line of precedent is causing more trouble than 
will be caused by disrupting the interests of those who relied on 
that precedent, then the Court ought to defer to the political 
branches' judgment about the reliance issue and decide the un-
derlying constitutional question according to its original mean-
ing. I argue that the political branches are better than the Court 
at figuring out when there are reliance interests and when those 
reliance interests are trumped by the existence of a constitu-
tional error. 
I thus contend that the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 10 got 
matters exactly backwards when it claimed that the Court should 
adhere most stringently to precedent when it is challenged by 
public opinion through the vehicle of the president filing briefs 
urging the overruling of Roe v. Wade. 11 I would claim that once 
the president files a brief asking the court to overrule, reliance 
interests are at an end and the Court is bound to decide the case 
on originalist, textualist grounds without regard to precedent. 
My argument in this respect is related to but also is critically 
different from Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen's argument that 
Congress ought to be able to abrogate stare decisis by statute.12 
Professor Paulsen reaches his conclusion through what is an un-
10. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
11. 410 u.s. 133 (1973). 
12. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Re-
move the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). 
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acceptably broad understanding of congressional power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, which he would allow Con-
gress to use to trump the Vesting Clause of Article III. I reach 
my conclusion, instead, by emphasizing the limits on the Su-
preme Court's power of judicial review due to the Constitution's 
departmentalist system for enforcing itself. That system leads to 
three-branch enforcement of the Constitution and to an obliga-
tion on the part of the Court to defer to the political branches on 
the political question of when a precedent is causing more harm 
than good, unless the Court can show that Congress's weighing 
of the costs and benefits of a given precedent lacks a rational ba-
sis. 
This three part discussion takes on a vast array of topics 
concerning text, precedent, and Burkeanism. I have decided to 
address all of these topics here in one article (rather than in 
three separate articles) because I think my discussion in each of 
the three parts below clearly related to the other two, consis-
tently leading back to the same conclusions about our practice, 
original understanding, and policy concerns. I end up endorsing 
a modest doctrine of stare decisis in cases where, as Andrew 
Jackson said, "the acquiescence of the people and the States" 
seems well-settled because all three branches of the federal gov-
ernment have completely accepted a constitutional interpreta-
tion that departs from the original understanding. This is the 
case, for example, as to the constitutionality of paper money, 
which is unjustifiable on originalist grounds but which is ac-
cepted by the American people as a settled precedent. Abortion, 
unlike paper money, is not an area where the acquiescence of 
the people and the States in Roe v. Wade is well-settled. For this 
reason, I conclude by urging that the Casey plurality opinion's 
discussion of stare decisis be overruled. 
I. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH 
RESPECT TO FOLLOWING PRECEDENT: LESSONS 
FROM THE 40 YEAR CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
I want to begin with the question of what the Framers 
thought about the question of whether precedent trumped con-
stitutional text. Unfortunately, here I must rely on post-
enactment legislative history to figure out what the Framers 
thought about the question of text versus precedent. Since there 
is absolutely no discussion of stare decisis in the text of the Con-
stitution, in the debates at Philadelphia or in the ratification de-
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bates, I want to ask what early Americans thought about the 
force of precedent with respect to the biggest controversy of 
constitutional interpretation to engulf the Republic during its 
first forty years. That, of course, is the controversy over the con-
stitutionality of the Bank of the United States. 
I want to start by making two points. The first is that the 
Framers thought the Constitution was going to be enforced not 
exclusively by the Supreme Court but instead by all three 
branches of the federal government and by the states, with each 
entity performing its own distinctive function of legislating, exe-
cuting, or adjudicating the laws. The second point is that early 
Americans only accepted precedent as binding where, as An-
drew Jackson put it, "the acquiescence of the people and of the 
States can be considered as well-settled." 13 It turns out that early 
Americans had a very stringent notion of just how well settled an 
issue had to be before it could be deemed to have the acquies-
cence of the people and the states. 
A. THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790-1811 
Early American views on precedent are clearly illustrated in 
the most famous sustained constitutional controversy in the na-
tion's early history-the forty-year controversy over the consti-
tutionality of the Bank of the United States. This controversy 
began in 1790 soon after the ratification of the Constitution 
when Alexander Hamilton "submitted a plan for a national bank 
to be chartered by Congress and owned jointly by private share-
holders and the United States."14 James Madison, a Congress-
man from Virginia, opened the debate over the Bank of the 
United States in the House of Representatives with a powerful 
argument as to why the Bank was unconstitutional. Representa-
tive Madison's view on the constitutionality of the Bank was the 
exact opposite of the one Hamilton had taken in proposing the 
Bank. Madison argued the federal government was one of lim-
ited and enumerated powers and that the word "necessary" in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be read as synony-
mous with "convenient," and he argued that the state ratifying 
conventions did not think the Necessary and Pro~er Clause gave 
any additional powers beyond those enumerated. 5 
13. Veto Message, supra note 1, at 1145. 
14. BREST, LEVINSON, BALKIN, AND AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (2000). 
15. See id. at 8-11 for a quick summary of Madison's views. 
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The House ultimately adopted the Bank bill over Madison's 
protest by a vote of 39 to 20, suggesting that almost two-thirds of 
the members of the House in 1791 and all the members of the 
Senate thought the Bank of the United Sates was constitutional. 
This was a particularly dramatic conclusion for Congress to 
reach since many of the members of that Congress had been 
delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention where a 
specific proposal to give the new national government the power 
to grant charters of incorporation had been defeated. Of the 
seven Representatives who had attended the Convention, four 
voted for the Bank Bill and three against it. Madison voted 
against the Bank Bill, even though at Philadelphia he had been 
the delegate who had actually proposed the failed resolution to 
give Congress power to enact charters of incorporation. 16 
The Bank Bill went to President Washington for his signa-
ture or veto, and Washington decided to poll the senior mem-
bers of his Cabinet to ask them for their views on the constitu-
tionality of a federally chartered Bank of the United States. Two 
Cabinet secretaries, Edmund Randolph, the Attorney General, 
and Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took the view that 
the Bank Bill was unconstitutional. Randolph and Jefferson 
shared Madison's objections to reading necessary as meaning 
"convenient" and to seeing the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
doing more than granting new incidental powers to the national 
government.17 Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, a 
co-author (with Madison and John Jay) of the Federalist papers, 
weighed in on the opposite side of the dispute and argued for a 
broad political understanding of the word "necessary." He con-
tended that the word meant "needful," "useful," or "conducive 
to." 18 On February 25, 1791, President Washington sided with 
Hamilton and signed the Bank Bill into law. The First Bank of 
the United States was thus created at the very start of our consti-
tutional history with the imprimatur of many of the Founders 
themselves, including, critically, George Washington, who had 
served as President of the Philadelphia Constitutional Conven-
tion. 
When the Bank's twenty-year charter lapsed in 1811, Con-
gress refused by a one-vote margin to renew it. 19 Of the thirty-
nine members of Congress who spoke on the issue of renewal, 
16. /d. at 7, 11. 
17. /d. at 11-12. 
18. !d. at 13-16. 
19. /d. at 16. 
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thirty-five addressed the issue of the Bank's constitutionality.20 
Thus, a large number of members of Congress, in 1811, did not 
regard the question of the constitutionality of the Bank as being 
off the table then just because the Bank had been around for 
twenty years and had been signed into law by George Washing-
ton himself. 
B. THE CREATION OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Dispute over the constitutionality of the Bank continued. 
Four years later, in 1815, after the economic turmoil caused by 
the War of 1812, Congress had a change of heart and voted to 
reauthorize the Bank. By 1815, James Madison had become 
President, and he vetoed the renewal of the Bank on policy 
grounds while saying that he "waiv[ ed] the question of the con-
stitutional authority of the Legislature to establish an incorpo-
rated bank, as being precluded, in my judgment, by the repeated 
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such 
an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in dif-
ferent modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the na-
tion."21 
A year later, in 1816, Madison's policy doubts about the 
Bank were quelled, and he signed a bill creating a Second Bank 
of the United States for another twenty years until 1836. Strik-
ingly, Madison accepted the constitutionality of the Bank in 1816 
because he recognized the force of precedent, but the precedent 
he recognized was not that of the Supreme Court, but rather the 
simultaneous expression of views by all three branches of the 
federal government to the effect that the Bank was constitu-
tional-views he took as showing "a concurrence of the general 
will of the nation". Professor Fallon thus notes that Madison's 
"more general view appears to have been that the meaning of 
vague constitutional language both could be and should be fixed 
by the construction put on it by the American people, acting 
through relevant political institutions, including Congress as well 
as the courts."22 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 17. 
22. Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 580 n.42 (citing 
DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 79-80 (1989)). 
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Madison's theory of constitutional precedent is discussed 
elegantly by Professor Gerard N. Maglioca in an important re-
cent article "Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional 
Law.'m Maglioca accurately describes Madison's approach as 
Burkean rather than originalist, and he notes that for Madison 
precedent was not made by the Supreme Court alone but by the 
general will of the public, as expressed through the views of all 
three branches of the federal government acting together, and by 
the states. "Madison's system argued for the equivalence of leg-
islative, executive, and judicial precedent in discerning constitu-
tional meaning. "24 Maglioca shows that for Madison the statu-
tory enactments of Congress were the key in establishing 
precedent, and he notes that Madison's view had a profound im-
pact on legal debate up until the Civil War, with Justice McLean 
citing Madison's bank veto as support for the precedentiallegis-
lative authority of the 1820 Missouri Compromise in his dissent 
in the Dred Scott case, which struck down the Compromise as 
unconstitutional.25 
Years after his bank veto, Madison expanded on his inter-
pretative view in letters to C.E. Haynes and General LaFayette 
saying no "abstract opinion of the text" could defeat "a construc-
tion put on the Constitution by the nation, which having made it, 
had the supreme right to declare its meaning,"26 a sentiment 
Madison later echoed in an 1831 letter to Charles Ingersoll?7 
Not surprisingly, given these views, Madison opposed Andrew 
Jackson's 1832 Bank veto on constitutional grounds because he 
thought the constitutionality of the Bank was absolutely settled 
as a matter of precedent?8 Madison's view on early practice be-
ing binding precedent is reflected in the Supreme Court's 1803 
opinion in Stuart v. Laird where Chief Justice John Marshall said 
that the constitutionality of circuit ridin.p by Supreme Court jus-
tices had been settled by early practice.2 
23. Gerard N. Maglioca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 
NEB. L. REV. 205 (1999). 
24. /d. at 217. 
25. /d. at 217 n.65 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 546 
(McLean, J., dissenting)). 
26. /d. at 217 n.62 (citing Letter from James Madison to General LaFayette (Nov. 
1826), in 3 LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 538, 542 (Philadelphia, 
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867)). 
27. /d. at 218 n.69 (quoting from Letter from James Madison to Ingersoll, in 4 
LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186, supra note 26). 
28. /d. at 218. 
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). In that case, the Court, after upholding the repeal 
of the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801, considered the controversial restoration of the 
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As David Currie points out in his magisterial book on The 
Constitution in Congress/0 the first Congresses to sit under the 
Constitution set forth many binding precedents as to constitu-
tional meaning, so Madison's view that statutory enactments, 
unquestioned in the other two branches, might fix a construction 
according to the general will of the nation is not surprising. What 
is perhaps more surprising to modern sensibilities is Madison's 
legalistic idea that the president could be constrained from exer-
cising his veto power for constitutional reasons by the force of 
statutory precedent. This idea seems strange to us because An-
drew Jackson so completely and successfully repudiated it that it 
is hard for us to recall that pre-Jackson there even was a point of 
view such as Madison's. 
C. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 
In 1819, some twenty-eight years after President Washing-
ton first signed the Bank Bill into law, the question of the Bank's 
constitutionality finally reached the Supreme Court, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland. 31 Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion 
for the Court, made an initial reference to precedent by ac-
knowledging that many successive legislatures and lower courts 
had accepted the constitutionality of the Bank, but he then went 
on to address in detailed and sweeping terms all the merits of the 
constitutional issue. It is critically important to emphasize that 
Marshall did not decide McCulloch on the basis of congressional 
statutory precedent or practice alone (as Madison would have 
done), but rather he decided it after an exhaustive de novo tex-
tual, structural, historical, functional, and consequentialist analy-
sis of the constitutional issue as it appeared to the Supreme 
Court. Marshall clearly did not buy the Madison view that the 
question of the constitutionality of the bank was settled by statu-
tory congressional precedent alone. Rather, Marshall wrote with 
astonishing breadth about the scope of congressional power un-
der the Necessary and Proper Clause. He seemed to regard 
questions of necessity under the clause as being peculiarly com-
mitted to the political branches, although he held out the possi-
practice of circuit riding by Supreme Court justices-a practice which some thought un-
constitutional. The Court upheld the constitutionality of requiring the justices to ride cir-
cuit saying "practice and acquiescence ... for a period of several years, commencing with 
the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed 
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. 
This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled." 
30. DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS (1997). 
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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bility of judicial invalidations in cases of clear congressional ex-
cess.32 Marshall's opinion is not primarily driven by precedent or 
practice but by the text, structure, history, purposes, and conse-
quences of ruling one way or the other on the issue. Thus, if we 
look at who in the Framing generation adheres to precedent or 
practice on the issue of the Bank, the only leading figure who 
seems to take that view is James Madison and not John Mar-
shall. 
D. JACKSON VETOES THE BANK IN 1832 AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In most constitutional law casebooks, discussion of the con-
stitutionality of the Bank begins and ends with Marshall's opin-
ion in McCulloch, but, of course, that is not how the story of the 
fight over the Bank of the United States actually ended. The 
fight over the constitutionality of the Bank ended in 1832 when 
Congress passed a bill rechartering the Bank some four years be-
fore the Bank's charter was due to expire. On July 10, 1832, 
President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill rechartering the Bank, 
and the Bank was killed not to reappear as an institution until 
the Federal Reserve Board was created during the Administra-
tion of President Woodrow Wilson. The Jackson veto killed the 
Bank33 for more than eighty years, and even when the institution 
32. 17 U.S. at 423 ("Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt meas-
ures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of 
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the 
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring 
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.") 
33. Jackson's message vetoing the Bank was foreshadowed by another famous 
Jackson veto message disapproving the Maysville Road internal improvements bill in 
1830. The Maysville Road veto message is important because, as Maglioca points out, in 
it Jackson began to articulate his rejection of Madison's Burkean notion that statutory 
precedent bound the president in his exercises of the veto power on constitutional 
grounds. In that veto message, Jackson first laid out the pure Jeffersonian position of 
opposition to internal improvements and then showed how Jefferson's view had been 
totally disregarded in practice. Jackson then points out "the difficulty, if not impractabil-
ity, of bringing back the operations of the Government to the construction of the (origi-
nal] Constitution." Then comes the veto's key message which claims that this whole sorry 
experience gave: 
an admonitory proof of the force of implication and the necessity of guarding 
the Constitution with sleepless vigilance against the authority of precedents 
which have not the sanction of its most plainly defined powers; for although it is 
the duty of all to look to that sacred instrument instead of the statute book, to 
repudiate at all times encroachments upon its spirit, ... it is not less true that 
the public good and the nature of our political institutions require that individ-
ual differences should yield to a well-settled acquiescence of the people and 
confederated authorities in particular constructions of the Constitution on 
doubtful points. 
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re-emerged in the form of the Federal Reserve Board it re-
emerged in a noticeably different form. 
Since it was Jackson and not Marshall who had the last 
word on the constitutionality of the Bank, we should attend just 
as carefully to Jackson's veto message as we do to Marshall's 
opinion in McCulloch, at least as far as the issue of the Founding 
Generation's understanding of precedent is concerned. Here is 
the totality of what Jackson said about precedent at the start of 
his veto message: 
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitu-
tionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by 
precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this 
conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous 
source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding 
questions of constitutional power except where the acquies-
cence of the people and the States can be considered as well 
settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an ar-
gument against the bank might be based on precedent. One 
Congress in 1791 decided in favor of a bank; another, in 1811, 
decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a 
bank, another, in 1816, decided in its favor. ... Prior to the 
present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn from that 
source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expressions 
of legislative, judicial, and executive opinions against the bank 
have probably been to those in its favor as 4 to 1. There is 
nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authorit¥ were 
admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me.3 
After this discussion of precedent, Jackson went on fa-
mously to talk of the co-equal role of each of the three branches 
of the federal government in the enforcement of the Constitu-
tion, insisting that he, as president, possessed a totally independ-
ent right to interpret the document without being bound in his 
judgment by either the opinion of the Supreme Court or by the 
earlier presidential and congressional practice upholding the 
constitutionality of the Bank. Jackson weighed the necessity of a 
bank and found it not necessary, and he condemned the bill es-
tablishing the bank as invading the proper prerogatives of the 
States. Jackson's veto message is written as if the "mere prece-
dent" of McCulloch, and the more than forty years since Wash-
ington signed the bank bill into law, were of no moment. Strik-
ingly, in his discussion of legislative precedents he never so much 
Veto Message of May 27, 1830, in supra note 1, at 1050. 
34. Veto Message, supra note 1, at 1144-45. 
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as mentioned James Madison's opinion as president that the 
question of the constitutionality of the Bank had been settled by 
practice!35 
Jackson revolutionized the practice of presidential vetoes by 
completely rejecting Madison's Burkean conception of constitu-
tional construction and of precedent. Thus, Daniel Webster 
complained on the floor of the Senate that "[t]he legislative 
precedents all assert and maintain the power [to set up a Bank]; 
and these legislative precedents have been the law of the land 
for almost forty years. They settle the construction of the consti-
tution, and sanction the exercise of the power in question so far 
as these ends can ever be accomplished by any legislative prece-
dents whatever. But the President does not admit the authority 
of precedent."36 
Without belaboring the story of Jackson's successful war 
against the Bank here, suffice it to say that Jackson completely 
prevailed over his Whig opposition, and he succeeded in increas-
ing the size of the Supreme Court from 7 to 9 members, allowing 
him and his successor, Vice President Martin Van Buren, to pack 
the Supreme Court with the "paramount doctrinal goal" of get-
ting McCulloch v. Maryland overruled in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.37 Jackson's chief Senate ally, Senator Benton, said on the 
floor of the Senate that with his Bank veto Jackson "has vindi-
cated the constitution from an unjust imputation, and knocked 
from under the decision of the Supreme Court the assumed fact 
on which it rested. He has prepared the way for a reversal of that 
decision .... "38 
E. JACKSON'S SUCCESSORS RATIFY THE KILLING OF 
THE BANK ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS 
So why was McCulloch never overruled? The answer is, had 
William Henry Harrison lived and signed a new Bank bill into 
law, the Jacksonians on the Supreme Court almost certainly 
would have gotten a case that would have allowed them to over-
turn McCulloch. Indeed, Harrison said in his Inaugural Address 
that "I believe with Mr. Madison that 'repeated recognitions un-
der varied circumstances in acts of the legislative, executive, and 
35. Maglioca, supra note 23, at 233. 
36. /d. at 234-35 (quoting 8 Cong. Deb. at 1231 (statement of Sen. Webster) (em-
phasis added)). 
37. /d. at 248-49. 
38. /d. at 249 (quoting 13 Cong. Deb. 502-04 (1837)). 
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judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indica-
tions in different modes of the concurrence of the general will of 
the nation'" settled the constitutional question of the Bank's 
constitutionality?9 By this statement, Harrison indicated his sup-
port for a new Bank bill on both constitutional and policy 
grounds. 
Unfortunately, for the advocates of the Bank, Harrison died 
a month after taking office and his anti-Bank, pro-states rights 
Vice President, John Tyler, became president. Tyler vetoed two 
bills passed by the Whig majority in Congress to recreate the 
Bank, citing Jacksonian enumerated powers grounds for his ve-
toes.40 As a result of Tyler's vetoes, the Bank was never recre-
ated and there was never a test case to challenge McCulloch and 
enshrine Jacksonian constitutional theory into Supreme Court 
doctrine. Ultimately, the fight between Tyler and the Whig Con-
gress ended in a stunning defeat of the Whigs in the mid-term 
elections of 1842, in which they soundly lost their majority in the 
House of Representatives.41 In 1844, Jacksonian Democrat 
James K. Polk was elected president and by that time the Bank 
was truly dead-killed by Jackson on originalist grounds. With 
the death of the Bank came the death of Madison's Burkean 
idea that the three branches of the national government could 
permanently settle constitutional questions as a matter of prece-
dent. Madisonian Burkeanism lost in the great constitutional 
fight over the Bank and that fight was resolved on originalist and 
not Burkean grounds. 
F. LESSONS FROM THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE BANK 
We can draw two conclusions from Jackson's veto of the 
bank bill in 1832 and the fact that his veto stuck for more than 
eighty years. First, early Americans were simply not persuaded 
in 1832 that the question of the constitutionality of the bank had 
yet been settled as a matter of precedent even though the Court 
had famously ruled in favor of the bank in McCulloch and even 
though the bank had been sanctified by practice for more than 
forty years. If an institution that had been around for that long, 
and which had the blessing of Presidents Washington and Madi-
son, and which had engendered very substantial economic reli-
ance interests, is not protected by precedent, then it is hard to 
39. !d. at 251. 
40. !d. at 252-60. 
41. !d. at 260. 
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conclude that early Americans had a very expansive notion of 
the authority of precedent. I submit that Jackson's politically 
successful attack on the constitutionality of the bank and on 
McCulloch proves that early Americans had a very limited con-
ception of the situations where precedent trumped the text of 
the Constitution. 
Second, for precedent to trump the constitutional text, 
popular opinion on the question would have to be so well settled 
that all three branches of the federal government were and had 
been in agreement on the question for a very long time. Jackson 
arguably thought the issue of the president's removal power had 
been so settled by the famous Decision of 1789 and the practice 
of his six predecessors as president.42 Controversy over the bank 
issue on the other hand had never entirely gone away. Accord-
ingly, that was not an issue that, in Jackson's view, could be re-
garded as being settled by precedent. Jackson's view of constitu-
tional precedent might thus suggest in modern terms that 
perhaps the decision in Knox v. Lee43 sanctioning paper money 
or the decision in Wickard v. Filbum44 upholding limits on the 
crops a farmer can grow on his own land might be examples of 
precedents that, even if wrong as an original matter, are none-
theless settled precedents since they clearly have long had the 
acquiescence of the whole people expressed in the views of all 
three branches of the national government. 
In contrast, the abortion question is clearly not settled as a 
matter of precedent in this same deep-seated way because in the 
thirty-two years since Roe v. Wade4 was decided it has been at 
least as much a source of agitation and disagreement as was the 
Bank of the United States between 1791 and 1832. I therefore 
submit that the great early fight over the Bank of the United 
Sates tells us that whenever the political branches of govern-
ment-motivated as they are by public opinion-contest a con-
stitutional issue, it cannot be regarded as being settled as a mat-
ter of precedent. There is simply no way one could conclude that 
the whole people of the United States acting through the me-
dium of all three branches of the federal government and of the 
States have accepted Roe v. Wade as binding precedent. 
42. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the 
First Half Century, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1451, 1526-59 (1997). 
43. 79 u.s. 457 (1870). 
44. 317 u.s. 111. 
45. 410 U.S. 113. 
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II. PROFESSOR MERRILL'S NORMATIVE CASE 
FOR FOLLOWING PRECEDENT OVER TEXT 
I have now discussed the original understanding and prac-
tice of Americans during the first fifty years of our history in fol-
lowing text or precedent in Part I. Both areas of practice counsel 
against a strong doctrine of judicial stare decisis in the U.S. Su-
preme Court's constitutional cases. I want now to turn to Profes-
sor Merrill's very substantial policy arguments in defense of 
what he calls conventionalism, so I can explain why I do not find 
them to be persuasive. I am focusing here on Professor Merrill's 
policy arguments in particular because Professor Merrill has laid 
out the normative case for the Supreme Court being bound by 
its precedents more clearly and more directly than any other 
scholar. In Burke v. Bark and in his article for this symposium 
issue, Professor Merrill mentions five policies that he says are 
promoted by forcing the Supreme Court to follow its constitu-
tional precedents. These policies are: 1) that following precedent 
promotes Rule of Law values; 2) that following precedent better 
promotes the conservative goal of maintaining continuity with 
the past than does Borkean originalism; 3) that following prece-
dent better comports with the inherent skepticism conservatives 
have and should have about the power of human reason to reor-
der society; 4) that following precedent is more democratic than 
would be following the Constitution's original meaning; and 5) 
that following precedent leads to less judicial activism than 
would result from the Court following the original meaning of 
the Constitution. I will discuss each of these five policies, in turn, 
and show why Professor Merrill is wrong on all five arguments as 
to why the Court should follow the doctrine over the document. 
A. RULE OF LAW CONSIDERATIONS 
First, Professor Merrill says a strong rule of stare decisis 
promotes rule of law values such as equal treatment of similarly 
situated litigants and predictability in the law. He claims that 
conventionalist sources of judicial decision-making, like prece-
dent, are thicker than are the originalist sources where the 
documentary record is often thin and contested. Accordingly, he 
calls for the Court "to enforce the current consensus view about 
the meaning of legal provisions, as reflected in precedent, the 
views of other branches, existing practice, and so forth. "46 
46. Merrill, Burke v. Bark, supra note 3, at 516; see generally id. at 515-18. 
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I disagree with Professor Merrill that following precedent 
rather than text better protects Rule of Law values. First of all, 
there is an underlying disagreement between Professor Merrill 
and me about what the law is in constitutional cases. He thinks 
the caselaw is the law and I think the text of the Constitution is 
the law. At one level then, saying that stare decisis promotes the 
rule of law is self-justifying because it is just another way of say-
ing that it is the caselaw that is the law and not the text. Textual-
ists think the constitutional text is the "touchstone" of constitu-
tional meaning, to quote Justice Frankfurter,47 so a good 
textualist will feel the Rule of Law is disserved in abortion cases 
if the Supreme Court follows Roe v. Wade rather than the origi-
nal meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Professor Merrill's claim that precedent is thicker than text 
and original history is provocative, but I think several responses 
might be made. First, Professor Merrill's view reflects deeply the 
training and biases of a lawyer trained in the common law Eng-
lish or American systems. Civil law lawyers in countries like 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or Japan follow the texts of those 
countries' civil law codes, and they do not follow precedent. No 
one would suggest that there is an absence of Rule of Law values 
like "equal treatment of similarly situated litigants" or "predict-
ability" in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, or Japan. As an em-
pirical matter, it is thus clearly possible to have a legal regime 
that gives no weight to precedent without losing anything in 
terms of Rule of Law values. Indeed, there are many more coun-
tries with civil law code systems around the world than there are 
common law countries. Most people in the developed world 
where the Rule of Law prevails live under systems of code, not 
systems of common law. 
Professor Merrill might object that the U.S. Constitution, in 
Chief Justice Marshall's famous words in McCulloch, "lacks the 
prolixity of a legal code" and so he might say there is not enough 
constitutional text in the United States to justify an analogy be-
tween American constitutional textualism and civil law practice. 
This is a fair point, and it is certainly the case that many parts of 
our constitutional text are worded at a high level of generality 
and the caselaw construing the text is thus of critical importance. 
This is certainly true, for example, with respect to the First 
Amendment where one cannot make sense of the law in the field 
without reference to caselaw. 
47. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S.466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Unlike Professor Paulsen and Professor Lawson,48 however, 
I am not of the view that it is always unconstitutional for the 
Court to give precedent determinative weight. Where the text is 
vague and all three branches of the federal government are con-
tent with the doctrine, I think the grant of "judicial" power to 
the Supreme Court probably does permit it to follow, for exam-
ple, its First Amendment precedent. Where I disagree with the 
argument that we should follow stare decisis is in situations like 
Roe v. Wade where the caselaw and the text and history clearly 
conflict, the doctrine has stirred up a political hornet's nest, and 
the political branches are openly taking steps to try to get the 
Court to cut back on or overrule its doctrine. In those situations, 
even our brief, abstractly worded Constitution clearly conflicts 
with precedent, and we have to make a fundamental choice be-
tween following the Constitution or following what past Su-
preme Courts have said about the Constitution. Because I think 
and the American people also think it is the document and not 
the doctrine that is the law, I submit that in those situations 
when the political branches ask the Court to follow the docu-
ment and not the doctrine, the Court ought to do so. 
There is one final sense in which the doctrine could be said 
to be thicker than the document and that is in the sense that 
there is literally more of it: it is bulkier, wordier, and takes 
longer to read. Thus, Professors Merrill and Strauss are fond of 
pointing out that the number of paragraphs in Supreme Court 
opinions and briefs discussing caselaw is greater than the num-
ber of paragraphs discussing text or original history. The first 
thing to be said in response to this argument is that the fact that 
the doctrine is bulkier than the document does not mean that the 
doctrine is more constraining of judicial discretion. In fact, I sus-
pect the exact opposite is true. The greater bulk of the doctrine 
means that it is easier for result-oriented judges to manipulate 
doctrinal arguments by "picking their friends out from among 
the crowd" as judges have been accused of doing with legislative 
history or with foreign sources of constitutionallaw.49 The doc-
48. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Pre· 
cedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005) and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible 
Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706,2731-33 (2003). 
49. I first remember this point having been made by former Chief Judge Patricia 
Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cricuit. The point has subsequently been 
made by Justice Scalia and by many others in criticizing the use of legislative history. The 
same point was most recently made by Supreme Court nominee John Roberts, in his con-
firmation hearings to be Chief Justice, as a reason why the justices ought not to rely on 
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trine is certainly bulkier than the document since there are more 
than 500 volumes of the U.S. Reports, while the Constitution is a 
few thousand words long, but that does not prove that the doc-
trine is more constraining. In fact, one can find caselaw support 
on both sides of almost any constitutional issue. Doctrine lends 
an air of lawyerly authenticity (and, for laypersons, of impene-
trability) to judicial decisions, but this does not mean doctrine 
restrains judicial discretion. To the contrary, I suspect doctrine 
gives judges more wiggle room to make policy both because it 
can be cited for any side of any proposition and because it can be 
used to pull the wool over the eyes of non-lawyers. I am thus un-
persuaded by Professor Merrill's intuition that the doctrine is 
thicker than the document and original history. 
Second, the mere fact that discussions in the U.S. reports of 
caselaw take up more paragraphs than the discussions of textual 
arguments does not change the fact that, as the Supreme Court 
has said itself, the text of the Constitution is the touchstone of 
constitutionality. The Court almost always leads with its textual 
arguments and only then discusses doctrine because it recognizes 
that the text is the bone and skeleton of any judicial decision 
while the discussion of doctrine is merely the fat. It is the textual 
arguments that really shape outcomes while doctrinal arguments 
are there to make a pleasant appearance. That is why the Court 
usually leads with textual arguments and only follows up with 
doctrinal ones. And that is why when the Supreme Court begins 
a sentence with "We hold ... " that sentence usually ends refer-
ring to the constitutional text and not to one of the Courts 
precedents. I thus do not deny Professor Merrill's and Strauss's 
contention that doctrinal discussions are bulkier in most Su-
preme Court opinions than are textual or originalist discussions. 
I do, however, deny that doctrinal discussions are as important 
as discussions of the document. 
There are two final things to say in response to Professor 
Merrill's claim that conventionalism promotes the Rule of Law. 
First, while predictability of constitutional law is an important 
value, another important value is getting the right answer to 
critical questions of constitutional meaning. If one thinks, as I 
do, that it is the text of the Constitution that is the law, faithful-
foreign sources of law in constitutional decision-making. Roberts noted that there is so 
much foreign constitutional law out there that it would be too easy for judges to use it 
politically by "picking out their friends from among the crowd." 
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ness to that text may be more important than the value of pre-
dictability. 
Second, and of critical importance, there is a time frame is-
sue with respect to predictability that Professor Merrill over-
looks. Following Supreme Court precedent may make our con-
stitutional law predictable over a short presentist time frame by 
minimizing overrulings. But there is also a longer time frame 
within which one wants to be consistent, which is relevant in con-
stitutional cases. We have some core constitutional traditions 
that go back 215 years to 1789 and some even more ancient con-
stitutional privileges that have their roots in 800 years of English 
constitutional law. 
I submit that the Rule of Law in constitutional cases re-
quires faithfulness not to present day conceptions of what is right 
but faithfulness to the ideas that have been fundamental over the 
grand sweep of our constitutional history. Thus, I would not 
evaluate the current President Bush's use of military commis-
sions simply by looking at the Supreme Court's overly enthusias-
tic endorsement of military commissions in the leading prece-
dent in this area: Ex Parte Quirin.50 I would look at the whole 
English and American tradition of the right to jury trial and to 
habeas corpus relief because I think consistency with 800 years 
of English and American history is more important than consis-
tency with a precedent handed down during a time of emergency 
50 years ago. Admitedly, there may be questions where new 
technologies or new social circumstances make it impossible to 
have an 800 year time frame as is the case for example in consid-
ering the legality of the administrative state. But, I still think that 
whenever possible we should strive for longer term time hori-
zons than the ten to twenty year time horizons that often seem to 
satisfy Professor Merrill. 
Finally, Professor Merrill may be right that the body of 
caselaw at the moment is thicker and more confining than is the 
body of text and originalist source material. We are corning out 
of a period when the Court cited precedents more than textual 
and originalist sources in justifying its decisions, and so lawyers 
arguing before the Court and law professors writing articles to 
persuade the Court have mainly made arguments to the Court 
from caselaw. However, as the Court has become more original-
ist with the appointments of Justices Scalia and Thomas, brief 
writers and law review article writers have turned more and 
50. 317 u.s. 1 (1942). 
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more to textualism and originalism as a methodology of constitu-
tional interpretation. The justices in turn take some of these tex-
tual and originalist arguments from the briefs and put them in 
Supreme Court opinions. My prediction is that as more original-
ists get appointed to the Supreme Court, the body of textualist 
and originalist materials for the Court to draw on will necessarily 
grow thicker because everyone will have an incentive to produce 
textualist and originalist arguments. I thus think Merrill's point 
about the current thinness of historical materials reflects only a 
transition problem as we move toward a more originalist Court. 
B. PRESERVING CONTINUITY WITH THE PAST 
Professor Merrill's second policy argument in Burke v. Bark 
in favor of stare decisis is that following precedent serves the 
fundamental conservative policy goal of "preserving continuity 
with the past."51 Basically, this is an argument against a legal sys-
tem that takes sudden lurches in new directions, displacing set-
tled precedent and practice along the way. My response here is 
to reiterate the same time framing issue I raised with respect to 
the Rule of Law above. On military commissions, for example, is 
it more important to maintain continuity with the Court's Ex 
Parte Quirin precedent from the 1940's or with the fundamental 
sweep of 800 years of English and American history? On abor-
tion, is it more important to follow a bitterly contested precedent 
from thirty years ago or is it more important to repudiate that 
precedent so as to tame a line of substantive due process disas-
ters that begins with Dred Scott and goes on to include Lochner? 
Sometimes preserving continuity with our fundamental values 
means displacing wayward practices and precedents that have 
grown up like barnacles on the pristine language of the constitu-
tional text. I thus have the same time framing quarrel with Pro-
fessor Merrill on preserving continuity with the past that I have 
with him on preserving Rule of Law values. 
C. SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE POWERS OF 
HUMAN REASON 
Third, Professor Merrill argues in Burke v. Bark that con-
ventionalism comports with a general skepticism that conserva-
tives share about the powers of human reason to reorder soci-
ety.52 I agree that conservatives share such a general skepticism. 
51. Merrill, Burke v. Bork, supra note 3, at 518-19. 
52. Merrill, Burke v. Bork, supra note 3, at 519-21. 
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That is why, for example, the English Glorious Revolution of 
1688 was celebrated as being a conservative revolution because 
it meant a restoration of timeless medieval values of English 
constitutional law. It was a revolution, or coming full circle and 
returning to the past: it was not like the French Revolution, a 
full-fledged break with the past. I think textualism and original-
ism don't call upon Supreme Court justices to remake society 
anew in the manner of the French Revolution. Rather, I think 
textualism and originalism call for emphasizing timeless, funda-
mental American constitutional values over contemporary prac-
tice. I thus think the kinds of revolutions originalism leads to are 
fundamentally conservative comings full circle rather than radi-
cal breaks with the past. 
For example, in Apprendi, Blakely, and United States v. 
Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court recently revived the notion that 
mandatory sentencing guidelines could not give judges the 
power to adjust upward a prisoner's sentence unless the facts jus-
tifying the upward adjustment are proved to a jury. Under Pro-
fessor Merrill's conventionalism, these cases are certainly 
wrongly decided because for about 20 years, since the adoption 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we have grown quite used 
to a reduced role for the jury in finding all the critical facts lead-
ing to a sentence. For Merrill, I assume, the fact that thousands 
of cases have been decided this way for twenty years means the 
Court's Apprendi line of cases is clearly a violation of conven-
tionalism. 
I think, of course, that the Court in the Apprendi line of 
cases rejected twenty years of wayward practice and restored an 
800-year-old fundamental right to jury trial under English and 
American law. Was this "revolutionary" decision consistent with 
a general skepticism about the powers of human reason? You 
bet it was. The innovation of the last twenty years in cutting back 
on the right to jury trials was the effort of the Sentencing Com-
mission to give us a more rational world, and it was that effort 
that smacked of the French Revolution. In rejecting the practice 
of the last 20 years and restoring the practice of the previous 800 
years, the Apprendi Court was leading a conservative "restora-
tive revolution," a coming full circle if you will and returning to 
the point where we started. 
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D. PROMOTING DEMOCRATICALLY 
ACCOUNTABLE LAW-MAKING 
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Fourth, Professor Merrill praises conventionalism because 
he thinks it will encourage democratically accountable decision-
making.53 He argues that this is the case first because conven-
tionalism "establishes a background understanding that allows 
legislatures (as agents of the people) to be more effective in pin-
pointing the changes they want to effect"54 and second because it 
shuts off the courts as avenues of social change. There are sev-
eral responses to this argument. First, as Merrill notes, textual-
ism is faithful to the people's original democratic will in estab-
lishing the Constitution, and it reduces judges to being a mere 
transmission belt of the people's original desires when they de-
cide cases faithfully to the text rather than by following prece-
dent. 
Second, there is again a critical, indeed dispositive, time 
framing issue that is raised by Merrill's argument. For example, 
did the Supreme Court in the Apprendi line of cases or in Brown 
v. Board of Education impose social change on the country? The 
answer is "yes" if we mean that current wayward practice was 
changed dramatically, but the answer is no if one believes with 
me that the Apprendi line of cases and Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation were justifiable as a matter of originalism. The displace-
ment of wayward practices that have grown up in violation of a 
fundamental constitutional right ought not to be analogized to 
the creation of new, historically unrooted constitutional rights 
like the so-called rights to an abortion or to engage in sodomy. 
Displacing wayward practices and heresies may look like the im-
position of social change if one has a short, presentist time hori-
zon, but if one has an 800-year constitutionalist's time horizon 
these displacements are "restorations," not impositions of social 
change. 
E. PROMOTING JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Finally, in his symposium piece in this issue, Professor 
Merrill argues that conventionalism leads to judicial restraint 
more than textualism and thus that conservatives, as advocates 
of judicial restraint, ought to be conventionalists. 55 He argues: 1) 
53. Merrill, Burke v. Bork, supra note 3, at 521-23. 
54. /d. at 521. 
55. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, supra 
note 3, at 274. 
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that in a democracy, innovation ought to come from elected poli-
ticians not unelected judges and 2) that it may help prevent 
judges from bending the rules to disfavor unpopular claimants or 
minorities. He goes on to argue that originalism is more com-
patible with the skill set of the average lawyer or judge in this 
country. Finally, he claims that the lower federal courts tend 
faithfully to follow Supreme Court precedent whereas the U.S. 
Supreme Court does not so faithfully follow its own precedents. 
Merrill then observes that few constitutional innovations emerge 
from the lower federal courts, and so he claims that this proves 
his point that following precedent leads to judicial restraint. 
There are several responses to be made to these points. 
First, describing following precedent as being restrained simply 
begs the question of whether it is the document or the doctrine 
that is the law. Obviously, a documentarian will think that fol-
lowing Roe v. Wade rather than the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not judicially restrained, but activist. More fun-
damentally, the fact that courts produce some social change 
when they sweep away wayward practices that have grown up 
does not make those courts activist over the grand sweep of 
American history. The sweeping away of wayward practices and 
the restoration of fundamental constitutional traditions is a form 
of conservative revolutionary change, not French revolutionary 
change. It is actually Merrill's privileging of the present and of 
the status quo that is radically unBurkean and activist. A true 
Burkean would look not only at what people think now or have 
thought in the last 15 years about a constitutional issue but at 
what all Americans who have ever lived under the Constitution 
have thought about that issue. Thus Merrill's presentism opens 
the door to the jettisoning of many of our fundamental rights. It 
is unBurkean for that very reason. 
As to judges and American lawyers not having the skill sets 
needed to practice textualism and originalism, as opposed to 
doctrinal analysis, that is a condition that would rapidly change if 
more originalists like Scalia and Thomas were appointed to the 
Supreme Court. Lawyers will learn, and law schools will teach, 
the skills that the Supreme Court determines are relevant to 
practicing law before it. In civil law countries, millions of lawyers 
are well trained in textual analysis and know nothing of doctrinal 
argument because that is what their legal system expects of 
them. I have no doubt the same situation could be made to occur 
here. 
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In sum, I am not persuaded by any of Professor Merrill's 
normative arguments that we should be conventionalists rather 
than textualists or originalists in constitutional interpretation. I 
think a true Burkean in this country ought to be an originalist 
and ought not to worship at the altar of the present day status 
quo. A preference for text over precedent may be inconvenient 
for professional lawyers who practice before the Supreme Court 
because textualism can produce surprises and professional law-
yers hate to be surprised. The professional interest, however, of 
those lawyers in being able to predict what the Court will do is 
less important than the interest ordinary American citizens have 
in preserving our deepest traditions and values even in the face 
of a contemporary wayward practice or heresy. 
III. WHY THE DISCUSSION OF STARE DECISIS IN 
THE CASEY OPINION SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
In Part I above, I showed that in the first great constitu-
tional controversy in American history, the fight over the consti-
tutionality of the Bank of the United States, early Americans re-
solved the controversy based on the text of the Constitution and 
did not follow precedent, thus suggesting that the first genera-
tion of Americans living under the Constitution thought that text 
trumps precedent. In Part II above, I showed that Professor 
Merrill's policy arguments for following precedent over text in 
constitutional cases do not hold water. In this Part want to con-
clude by asking whether in cases like Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey,56 where one of the political branches of the federal govern-
ment or a majority of the states challenges a precedent, the 
Supreme Court ought to be obligated to decide such a case 
based on the original meaning of the Constitution. 
A. WHEN SHOULD THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT 
FOLLOW PRECEDENT 
In criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Casey to fol-
low precedent when the executive branch in its brief had chal-
lenged that precedent based in part on the original understand-
ing, I mean to set aside and not address the question of whether 
the Supreme Court can follow precedent in other areas of doc-
trine where, as Madison or Andrew Jackson might have put it, 
the sense of the nation is that the construction of the text has 
56. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
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been settled by the whole people as a matter of precedent. I thus 
do not want to challenge the Supreme Court's reliance on prece-
dent in First Amendment cases, where a large body of 
nonoriginalist doctrine has grown up, or in cases involving the 
constitutionality of paper money or of the New Deal where ar-
guably Wickard v. Filbum is unjustifiable on originalist 
grounds. 57 The current practice in the Supreme Court has been 
to sometimes revisit such precedents on originalist grounds, even 
when the Court has not been asked to do so by the President or 
Congress, but I want to focus here solely on the question of 
whether the Court has the power to fall back on stare decisis 
when the President or a majority of the Senate or House of Rep-
resentatives is asking the Court to render a decision based on the 
original meaning of the constitutional text. 
I submit that in such cases the Court is obligated to decide 
cases based on the text of the Constitution and that it cannot in-
voke stare decisis when the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment are asking for a ruling based on the text. I thus con-
clude that the Casey plurality has matters exactly backwards 
when it complains about the fact that the executive branch had 
repeatedly come into Court to challenge the constitutionality of 
Roe v. Wade. The Court said that in such cases, where it is under 
fire, it is especially bound by stare decisis to stand firm and not 
reconsider its precedent. I think the exact opposite is the case. It 
is in cases where the President, the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives claim in a brief before the Court that a precedent is 
doing more harm than good that a Court ought to be most dis-
posed to decide a case based on text and original understanding. 
B. THE MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ARTICLE 
Discussion of this problem must necessarily begin with Pro-
fessor Michael Stokes Paulsen's brilliant law review article argu-
ing that Congress has the power, legislating under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, to abrogate stare decisis in abortion and all 
other cases by passing a statute.58 A brief summary of Professor 
Paulsen's extremely clever argument is in order. First, Paulsen 
57. I have no problems with other leading New Deal cases on originalist grounds. 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 657 (1941); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937); and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), all seem to me to be 
correctly decided as a matter of the original understanding. Wickard, however, does not 
seem to me to be rightly decided under originalism, although it may now be protected by 
stare decisis. 
58. Paulsen, supra note 12. 
2005] OVERRULING CASEY 337 
notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly described its rule 
of stare decisis as being a doctrine of policy, like a prudential 
standing rule or a decision of federal common law, and that the 
Court has not said stare decisis is constitutionally based.59 Thus, 
Paulsen quotes the Court in Casey as saying that "it is common 
wisdom that stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command"' and 
that "when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is 
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a 
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. "60 
Paulsen quotes many similar statements by the Court to the ef-
fect that stare decisis is a doctrine of policy and not constitutional 
mandate from cases such as Agostini v. Felton,61 Seminole 
Tribe,62 and Adarand Constructors v. Pena,63 
Having shown that stare decisis is a doctrine of policy and is 
not constitutionally based, Professor Paulsen then goes through 
the five policies of precedent listed in Casey: workability, reli-
ance, "remnant of abandoned doctrine," changed facts, and judi-
cial integrity, and he shows that Congress is institutionally better 
situated than is the Supreme Court to legislate or pronounce a 
policy as to those matters under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.64 Paulsen discusses Congress's sweeping powers under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and he asks whether anything 
in the constitutional text, history, structure or practice gives the 
federal judiciary an autonomous constitutional power to pre-
scribe a doctrine of stare decisis.65 
Paulsen concludes that no such autonomous federal judicial 
power exists, and he insightfully points to numerous early acts of 
Congress in tension with the notion that there is such an 
autonomous power. Among the Acts mentioned by Paulsen as 
59. /d. at 1543-51. 
60. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
61. 521 U.S. 203,235 (1997) ("As we have often noted 'stare decisis is not an inexo-
rable command', but it instead reflects a policy judgment that 'in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.' That pol-
icy is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be 
altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions."). 
62. 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (the Court has "' always ... treated stare decisis as a 
principle of policy ... and not as an inexorable command"). 
63. 515 U.S. 200, 231-35 (1995) ("[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and question-
able"). 
64. Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1551-67. 
65. /d. at 157(}..82. 
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showing broad congressional power to direct the courts in their 
deciding of cases are: the Rules of Decision Act,66 the Full Faith 
and Credit Act,67 the Anti-Injunction Act,68 laws abrogating the 
Court's prudential standing rules,69 the Rules Enabling Act of 
1934 creating the Federal Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure, 
Appellate Procedure, and Criminal Procedure/0 and finally the 
legislatively mandated rules for the disqualification of federal 
judges from sitting on and deciding certain matters.71 He estab-
lishes that as a matter of practice, since the earliest days of our 
history, Congress has passed statutes pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause that constrain the judiciary substantially in 
their deciding of cases or controversies. 
Professor Paulsen's argument is extremely clever, and, if I 
thought with him and with Professor Lawson that it was uncon-
stitutional for the Supreme Court to follow precedent rather 
than the original meaning of the Constitution, I would then con-
clude that perhaps Congress could under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause direct the Court to do what it ought to do anyway. 
I am not persuaded by Paulsen and Lawson, however, that it is 
unconstitutional for the Court under some circumstances to 
choose to follow precedent. While I cannot in this article re-
spond fully or adequately to all of Professor Paulsen's arguments 
as to why there is no autonomous constitutional power of courts 
to follow stare decisis, I remain unpersuaded. To mention just a 
few of the arguments against Professor Paulsen's position, one 
should consider the following pieces of evidence. First, it is 
surely noteworthy (as Professor Paulsen acknowledges) that 
Alexander Hamilton made the following statement in Federalist 
Number 78, the essay in which Hamilton derives and justifies the 
power of judicial review: 
To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensa-
ble that they should be bound down by strict rules and prece-
dents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be 
conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of 
the wickedness and folly of mankind, that the records of those 
precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable 
bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a 
66. Jd. at 1584. 
67. Id. 
68. /d. at 1585 
69. Id. at 1585-86. 
70. Id. at 1587-89. 
71. Id., at 1589-1590. 
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competent knowledge of them. 72 
To this statement by Hamilton in The Federalist must be added 
James Madison's statement in his 1831 letter to Jared Ingersoll, 
arguing for the precedential effect of legislation like the Bank 
Bill by analogizing such legislation to the practice of judges in 
"solemnly repeated and regularly observed" judicial precedents 
of following precedents with which they disagree. Joseph Story 
picks up on this theme and makes the same point in his 1833 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States where 
he asserts, without support, that "this conclusive effect of judicial 
adjudications, was in the full view of the framers of the Constitu-
tion. "73 To this, it might be added that Marshall Court opinions 
like Ogden v. Saunders74 and early Taney Court opinions like 
Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln75 discuss precedents at 
some length and in a way that suggests they have weight of their 
own. 
More recently, in cases like United States v. Klein,76 in Plaut 
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,77 in City of Boerne v. Flores,78 and in 
Dickerson v. United States/9 the Supreme Court has found un-
constitutional federal statutes that seemed to try to direct the 
Court to decide a particular case in a particular way. Given the 
Court's reaction to the federal statutes struck down in Klein, in 
Plaut, in City of Boerne, and in Dickerson, I find it hard to be-
lieve that the Court would uphold a federal statute abrogating 
stare decisis in abortion cases. My prediction in fact is that such a 
statute would meet almost precisely the same fate as did Con-
gress's effort in Dickerson to overturn Miranda by statute. In 
Dickerson, Congress tried to legislate to overturn a doctrine (the 
Miranda Warning) that the Court had previously said was not 
constitutionally based. The Court's predictable reaction was to 
dig in its heels and say that the doctrine in question was constitu-
tionally based after all. Outside the strange world of the Dor-
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 
1982). For Professor Paulsen's lengthy, though to me unpersuasive, attempt to explain 
away this passage, see Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1572-78. 
73. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 378 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1883). For Professor Paulsen's response 
to Story, see Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1578. 
74. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
75. 36 u.s. 102 (1837). 
76. 80 u.s. 128 (1872). 
77. 514 u.s. 211 (1995). 
78. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
79. 530 u.s. 428 (2000). 
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mant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has been very un-
willing to allow Congress to overturn its constitutional rulings by 
statute. 
Finally, and of critical if not decisive importance for me, to 
these points it might be added that since very early on in our his-
tory the Supreme Court has as a matter of practice cited, dis-
cussed, and relied on precedent in at least some bodies of law, 
and Congress and the President have for a century and one-half 
raised no objection to this long-settled judicial practice! In 216 
years, Congress has never even discussed impeaching a justice 
for following precedent rather than the text of the Constitution. 
One might therefore argue that even under Andrew Jackson's 
view of precedent expressed in the Bank of the United States 
controversy, that it has been settled by the whole people of the 
United States probably since before the Civil War that "the judi-
cial Power" vested by Article III at least sometimes gives the 
Supreme Court the autonomous power to follow precedent 
rather than constitutional text. My conclusion is therefore that 
practice has settled the matter such that the Court does have an 
autonomous, implied power to sometimes follow precedent, just 
as the president has an implied power to remove executive 
branch subordinates, and that neither of these implied powers 
can be restricted by Congress legislating under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. I therefore must regretfully disagree with 
Professor Paulsen.80 
C. RESCUING THE PAULSEN ARGUMENT WITH 
DEPARTMENTALISM 
Despite the disagreements I have with Professor Paulsen as 
described above, I have to say that I think his fundamental intui-
tion is sound that there is something very odd about the Su-
preme Court being the institution that gets to determine when 
the costs of retaining a precedent outweigh the reliance interests 
the precedent has generated. Assessing the costs to society asso-
ciated with retaining a precedent and weighing those costs 
against the reliance interests of society that a precedent may 
have generated is fundamentally an empirical and a political 
task. It is the sort of task that would seem, as Paulsen correctly 
intuits, to be much more within the competence of the political 
branches of the federal government than it is within the compe-
tence of the Supreme Court. 
80. See Lawson, supra note 48; Fallon, supra note 7. 
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First, the political branches of the federal governments have 
much better institutional tools for assessing the twin empirical 
questions of: 1) what costs is a precedent currently imposing on 
society and 2) to what extent have reliance interests grown up 
around a precedent suggesting it ought to be retained. The 
House and Senate can investigate these empirical questions by 
holding hearings, by talking to constituents in an ex parte man-
ner, and by commissioning national studies by such agencies as 
the General Accounting Office. The President can investigate 
these matters by appointing commissions to study and investi-
gate them, by asking his millions of subordinates in the executive 
branch to gather information for his perusal, and by conducting 
other traditional investigations. 
The Supreme Court's sources of empirical information, on 
the other hand, are limited to the information presented to it in 
briefs and amicus briefs and to what it can glean from oral argu-
ment. The justices lead isolated and sheltered lives in a kind of a 
cocoon protected by hundreds of police officers, and they are 
forbidden from discussing the empirical issues that arise in their 
cases with anyone other than each other and their law clerks. 
The justices have no home state offices to return to, no town 
meetings at which to gather information, no constituents with 
whom they can correspond, and no expert committee or investi-
gatory personnel upon whom they can rely. In short, the justices 
are far less able than the President, the Senate, or the House to 
gather empirical information on: 1) what costs a precedent is 
currently imposing on society and 2) to what extent reliance in-
terests have grown up around a precedent, suggesting it should 
be retained. 
Ironically, Justice Souter himself, reputedly the author of 
the Casey plurality opinion's paean to stare decisis, has stated 
that Congress's "institutional capacity for gathering evidence 
and taking testimony far exceeds" the Court's.81 For that reason, 
in Commerce Clause cases, Justice Souter believes that "(b)y 
passing legislation, Congress indicates its conclusion, whether 
explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the commerce 
power" and, Souter argues, that the congressional judgment on 
the existence of jurisdictional facts in Commerce Clause cases 
should be reviewed only for rationality. 82 There is no reason to 
believe that Congress's superiority, as a factfinder, is any greater 
81. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
82. !d. 
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in Commerce Clause cases than it is in cases where Congress is 
weighing the cost of retaining a precedent against the reliance 
interests that precedent has engendered. Therefore, applying 
Justice Souter' s standard of review of congressional factfinding 
in Commerce Clause cases to stare decisis suggests that, under 
the Souter approach, the Supreme Court ought to defer to Con-
gress's cost/benefit analysis as to whether to retain a precedent, 
unless it is clearly irrational. 
Beyond the difficulty of obtaining empirical information in 
cases where stare decisis might be invoked, there is the separate, 
equally difficult problem of weighing the costs a precedent is 
currently imposing on society against the reliance interests that 
have grown up around a precedent suggesting that it should be 
retained. This can involve a weighing of policies that is uniquely 
political and inappropriate for the Supreme Court to undertake. 
How can a Court possibly weigh the harms caused to society by 
legalized abortions against the reliance interest of women in hav-
ing Roe v. Wade retained? This type of weighing of incommen-
surables is quintessentially the function of the policy-making 
branches of the federal government and not of the Supreme 
Court. Maybe the President, elected indirectly by the people of 
the nation as a whole or a majority of the Senate and House can 
weigh the loss of fetal life against the reliance interest of women, 
but how can a court of law possibly do such a thing? Such a 
weighing of incommensurables is surely far removed from the 
weighing common law courts traditionally did in England before 
1787 in cases in law or equity. 
A skeptic might respond by saying that "the judicial Power" 
conferred by Article III comprehends the power to define and 
enforce constitutional guarantees, but the Court has only 
claimed such a power for itself since Cooper v. Aaron. 83 For most 
of our history, it has been understood that all three branches of 
the federal government play a role in constitutional interpreta-
tion: Congress when it exercises its Article I powers, the Presi-
dent when he signs bills into law and executes the laws that re-
sult, and the courts when they decide cases or controversies. 84 As 
Marbury v. Madison famously shows, the Constitution does not 
83. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
84. Ironically and amusingly, some of the best writing about departmental or coor· 
dinate constitutional review is by none other than Professor Paulsen. See Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 217 (1994). Professor Paulsen probably intuits the force of such argument in this con· 
text of judicial scrutiny of precedent, but he never squarely addresses the question. 
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have a "judicial review clause" or a "power of constitutional in-
terpretation clause" in it. The Supreme Court's power to decide 
constitutional cases and controversies in accordance with the 
Constitution is part of a coordinate system of three-branch en-
forcement of the Constitution. It was for this reason that James 
Bradley Thayer argued more than a century ago that when cases 
reach the Supreme Court they arrive with so strong a presump-
tion of constitutionality that the Court ought only to strike those 
laws down when it concludes the political branches of the federal 
government have made "a clear mistake."85 Thayer's Rule of a 
Clear Mistake was adopted by no less an authority than the elder 
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Lochner v. New York where 
Harlan said that only if the legislature's view that a law was an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power was clearly mistaken 
should that law be struck down.86 Harlan's view became govern-
ing law once the Court in United States v. Caroline Producti7 
and in Williamson v. Lee OpticaZS8 replaced judicial review of the 
reasonableness of laws with judicial review under a rational basis 
test pursuant to which laws are upheld as reasonable exercises of 
the police power if they are supported by a rational basis. 
Thayer's Rule of Clear Mistake overstates the deference the 
Supreme Court is bound to pay to the judgments of Congress 
about a law's constitutionality, and I have previously written in 
opposition to that degree of deference by the Court to the politi-
cal branches.89 I do, however, think that decisions of the policy-
making branches of government are implicitly both policy and 
constitutionality judgments and that those decisions therefore 
arrive at the Court with a presumption of constitutionality. 
When Congress and the President adopt a law barring partial 
birth abortions they are in my judgment not only making policy 
but are also expressing their view as coordinate and co-equal 
branches to the Supreme Court that the regulation of partial 
birth abortion is permissible, notwithstanding the court's con-
trary view expressed in Stenberg v. Carhart.90 That judgment by 
the political branches is entitled to a presumption of constitu-
tionality in a case or controversy before the Supreme Court. 
85. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 151 (1893) 
86. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 72-73 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See 
generally Steven G. Ca!abresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. L.REv. 269 (1993). 
87. United States v. Caroline Products, 344 U.S. 144 (1938). 
88. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
89. See Calabresi, supra note 86. 
90. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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Only if a preponderance of the evidence shows that the political 
branches are wrong in their judgment on the constitutional ques-
tion does the Constitution empower the Court to hold a law un-
constitutional in a case or controversy. 
I submit that on the empirical and policy question of whether 
the benefits of overturning a precedent outweigh the reliance in-
terests engendered by that precedent the Supreme Court ought 
always to defer to the judgment of politically elected officials like 
the President, a majority of the Senate or the House, or a majority 
of the States, unless those democratically accountable officials can 
be shown to have acted irrationally. If these powerful democrati-
cally accountable factfinders and policy-makers think that the 
costs of following precedent outweigh the benefits of overruling it, 
the Supreme Court ought always to disregard stare decisis and de-
cide the case before it on its merits according to the text of the 
Constitution. This does not mean the political branches should 
automatically win. It means only that the coordinate, coequal, po-
litical branches of government are constitutionally entitled to 
force the Supreme Court to rule on the merits and not to fall back 
on the policy of stare decisis. 
There are a number of issues of American constitutional 
law that the Constitution textually commits to the political 
branches of government. Thus, the President has broad power 
over constitutional foreign policy issues, the Senate has the last 
word on the trial of impeachments,91 and the Congress has the 
last word on the ratification of constitutional amendments.92 
These cases are said to be nonjusticiable because they raise po-
litical questions-i.e. constitutional issues over which the Consti-
tution has delegated enforcement power to one of the nonjudi-
cial branches. I think the power to empirically assess: 1) the costs 
a precedent is imposing on society and to weigh those costs 
against 2) the reliance interests that have grown up around that 
precedent is quintessentially a power that under our Constitu-
tion ought to belong to the elected, political branches of the gov-
ernment, both because of their superior fact-finding capacity and 
because of their greater legitimacy and greater ability to weigh 
incommensurables. I therefore submit that the presumption of 
constitutionality that attaches to all actions of the political 
branches of the government ought to force the Supreme Court 
to decide any constitutional issue those branches choose to raise 
91. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,232-33 (1993). 
92. Id. at 241 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,457-60 (1939)). 
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on their textual merits and without regard to the "policy" of 
stare decisis. 
Some good Burkeans might respond at this point that the 
judicial restraint that three-branch coordinate enforcement of 
the Constitution leads to may comport with the original under-
standing of the Constitution, but for a long time now we have 
lived in a regime where the Supreme Court is "supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution. "93 I would dispute that 
claim. In times of emergency, Presidents and Congresses have 
traditionally challenged the Supreme Court in this country by in-
sisting on their textually granted co-equal powers as constitu-
tional interpreters. Jefferson did this in challenging the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, Jackson did it in challenging the constitution-
ality of the Bank of the United States, Lincoln did it in challeng-
ing the constitutionality of Dred Scott, Franklin Roosevelt did it 
in challenging the nine old men, and Ronald Reagan did it in 
challenging Roe v. Wade. There may be a tradition in ordinary 
times of deferring to the Supreme Court on many constitutional 
issues like the meaning of the First Amendment, but there is also 
a tradition, on big occasions, of the political branches reasserting 
their roles as constitutional interpreters and demanding that the 
Court back down. When the President of the United States 
shows up in the Supreme Court five times in a decade demand-
ing that the Court reverse Roe v. Wade, the least that the pre-
sumption of constitutionality entitles him to is that the Court 
rule on the merits and not hide behind a phony policy of invok-
ing phony reliance interests. The Court thus got it exactly back-
wards in Casey. Rather than responding to repeated presidential 
requests that Roe be overruled by digging in its heels, the Court 
ought to have recognized the conversation it had gotten itself 
into with the political branches and addressed the abortion issue 
on its textual, constitutional merits. That that ought to have led 
to an overruling of Roe on the ground that the abortion right is 
not deeply rooted in our history and tradition is to me, at least, 
self-evident. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a good Burkean living in the American con-
stitutional culture should be a textualist and should follow the 
93. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). Tom Merrill, however, is a good 
Burkean who endorses Departmentalism. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as 
Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments," 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993). 
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document, not the doctrine. Our actual practice in this country, 
since 1937, is one of repeated overrulings and disregardings of 
precedent on every single major constitutional issue, except 
abortion. We do not, in fact, live in a common law constitutional-
ist or a conventionalist nation, although some distinguished and 
eminent lawyers who have worked in the Solicitor General's of-
fice may be under the mistaken impression that we do. This dis-
tinctively American focus on the document over the doctrine is 
evident in our early constitutional history in the first big fight we 
had over a constitutional issue-the fight over the constitutional-
ity of the Bank of the United States. That fight shows that one of 
the founders, James Madison, believed in a very limited theory 
of legislative precedent whereby prior Congresses could bind 
subsequent Congresses on constitutional issues. Madison never, 
however, endorsed anything like Planned Parenthood v. Casey's 
imperialistic doctrine of judicial stare decisis, and, in any event, 
Madison's view of legislative precedent was considered and deci-
sively rejected in the 1830's by the Jacksonians. The Jacksonian 
vision of the primacy of the document over the doctrine led to 
the successful annihilation of the Bank, which was not to reap-
pear in its modern Federal Reserve Board form until the Wood-
row Wilson administration. It is hard, thus, to speak of an origi-
nal understanding as to precedent, but it is fair to say that when 
the question of following precedent first seriously emerged forty 
years into our history, in 1832, early Americans decided to fol-
low the document, not the doctrine. The tradition in the United 
States is thus a tradition of the written Constitution, which is 
why all good American Burkeans ought to be textualists and not 
conventionalists or common law constitutionalists. 
Policy considerations support this conclusion that the Su-
preme Court ought to follow the constitutional text over prece-
dent. Rule of law concerns, enhancement of democracy con-
cerns, and arguments from judicial restraint all point in this 
direction, contrary to the distinguished scholarship of my former 
colleague Thomas Merrill. The problem with conventionalism or 
common law constitutionalism is that it prevents the people from 
checking the Court by appealing from the doctrine to the docu-
ment through the medium of the President, the Senate or the 
House. Moreover, a common problem with all of Professor 
Merrill's policy arguments for conventionalism is that he uses 
too short a time frame in claiming that conventionalism is, for 
example, more faithful to the rule of law than is originalism. If 
one uses the multi-generational time frame that is obviously ap-
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propriate in constitutional cases, then it is originalism and not 
conventionalism that best serves rule of law, democracy, and ju-
dicial restraint-enhancing values. It is thus conventionalism and 
common law constitutionalism that are undemocratic and activ-
ist, not textualism. 
It is probably fair to assume that, under our traditions, the 
Supreme Court can choose to follow precedent over text and 
original meaning on some occasions-as the important work of 
Charles Fried shows to be the case with First Amendment case-
law.94 It is probably also fair to assume that Professor Michael 
Stokes Paulsen is wrong that congressional power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is broad enough to allow the con-
gressional abrogation of stare decisis, given our tradition of judi-
cial decisional independence and of occasionally allowing judges 
to choose to follow precedent over original meaning. But it is 
also probably fair to assume that the Supreme Court does not 
have the unique power under the Constitution to interpret the 
Constitution. The Court shares the power of constitutional re-
view with Congress and the President, and it is for that reason 
that all their actions arrive at the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality. 
Some constitutional issues like the issue of whether a prece-
dent is causing more harm than it is worth, given reliance inter-
ests, are uniquely within the capability of the political branches 
alone to assess. This is the case both because they raise empirical 
issues the political branches can better ascertain and because 
they involve a comparing of incommensurables, which the politi-
cal branches are better suited to make. What this means, at a 
bare minimum, is that when the President, a majority of the Sen-
ate or House, or a majority of the States show up in the Supreme 
Court claiming that a precedent is causing more harm than it is 
worth, given reliance interests, the presumption of constitution-
ality ought to force the Court to defer to the political branches' 
judgment on the reliance issue (unless it is irrational) and ought 
to force the Court to decide the case based on its best under-
standing of the constitutional text. This is so because the political 
branches have greater institutional capacity to do a cost/benefit 
analysis on a precedent in much the same way as the President 
has greater institutional capacity to decide foreign policy ques-
tions. 
94. Fried, supra note 8, at 80. 
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The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey was 
thus 180 degrees wrong to say that the Court should try the 
hardest to stand its ground when its precedents are being chal-
lenged with the most verve. When the President of the United 
States, who is sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the Consti-
tution, appears in the Supreme Court five times in a decade ask-
ing the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade the very least the Court 
ought to do is decide the case on its textual merits and not on the 
basis of stare decisis. To the extent the Casey plurality opinion in 
its discussion of stare decisis says otherwise, that opinion ought 
now to be swiftly and ignominiously overruled. 
